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-Towards A Critique of Contemporary Anaesthetics 
Guy Sircello 
If we consider the entire history of philosophical Aesthetics (capital-"A" 
aeschecics) ,  we can discover in ic two chief sub-areas: aesthetics (small-"a" 
aesthetics), or the srudy of a kind of experience, its general conditions and range 
of "objects," on the one hand, and, on the other, the philosophy of art. But if we 
survey the field of Aesthetics over the last fifty years or so - both in North 
America and Britain and on the European continent, we can detect - and we 
do noc have to look hard ro do so - a massive and progressive trend away from 
the sub-area of aesthetics; this trend exemplifies the "anaesthetics" of my title. 
Now this anaesthetic tendency of modem philosophical Aesthetics shows itself 
in cwo main ways: (i) the almost exclusive preoccupation with the philosophy of 
arr and (ii) the negative attitudes - ranging from indifference to outright 
hostility - to aesthetics as characterized above. Since the great books on 
Aesthetics of Dewey and Collingwood, the proportion of philosophical Aesthet· 
ics devoted to aesthetics proper - in the Anglo-American tradition, at least -
mu.sc be minuscule; the subject is virtually ignored. And the hostility has shown 
icself most clearly in attacks on the concept of beauty - since traditionally 
beauty has always been discussed in association with its mode of apprehension in 
us and its effects on us - and in direct attacks on the concept of the aesthetic 
acticude. Such attacks have not been launched, moreover, with a view to 
correcring older views of beauity or aesthetic expe·rience, but, on the contrary, 
with the intention of consigning these concepts to oblivion. 
Now although these twin �'anaesthetic" tendencies have jointly dominated 
contemporary Aesthetics, the history of Aesthetics itself demonstrates that a 
primary interest in the philosophy of art does not necessarily imply hostility to 
beauty or aesthetic experience in general. In this paper I want to suggest, in fact, 
a way in which taking a certain kind of art and a certain theory of art seriously leads 
necessarily not only to a higher reevaluation of aesthetics but. ultimately and 
ironically, also to a kind of indifference or even hostility to art itself as an 
institution. Thus, whereas in the present state of affairs in Aesthetics, the 
pre-0ecupation with art and its philosophy has led to a trivialization of beauty and 
aesthetics in general, the kind of art and its theory that I want to explore here 
leads finally - in a moment, not of self-cannibalization, but of liberation - to a 
trivialization of the artworld and its characteristic pursuits. 
Quite obviously, the view of art I am about to propose is antagonistic co the 
one elaborated by Arthur Danco over the last quarter century. Danto•s view, in 
my opinion, encapsulates the anaesthetic tendencies of comempo-rary philoso� 
phy in an especially dear and vivid form. It certainly exemplifies those 
tendencies, for Danto's "Aesthetics" is, in the first place, nothing but a 
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philosophy of an; it has no po ta\ e conmbuuon at all co make ro ae cheuc'. 
And, m the second place, Danto tends to di parage and tn\·tah:e ae rhencs in 
the few remarlc.s he malces on the sub1ecc. I am chinking here, m part, of DanL1 
explicit arguments co the effect that ae chetic con 1deraic1on cannot be U'cJ lo 
define art and that, therefore, aeschetic coruiderations mu c be .. ccondan ,. 1n 
the philosophy of an.1 For whereas within Danco's own luniced frame of refer. 
ence these points are well .. taken, they nevertheless presuppo·e an extremelv 
trivializing view of beauty as the purely sensory. Bue I am chinking, more 
importantly, of Danto's tone in discussing aeschetic consideracions and, in 
particular, beauty and the responses to it. Thus he speaks, for example, of an' 
threatened "servicude ro aesthetics" and "bondage co preniness" as if beauty an:. 
prettiness were rhe same and as if ro see aestherics as central to art were co 
imprison arc in some way.2 (What he apparently ignores is that the latter would 
be true only if one first assumes the former, ilHcit identification.) And thu 1 coo 
Danco writes of the response co beauty as a "delectation.,3- like �acing candi� 
violets perhaps! And Listen to Danco as he imagines someone, a la George 
Dickie, admiring the beauties of Duchamp's urinal, who will "stand back and 
vibrate to the arctic sublimities of Mott Works's finest, responding aescheticaU) 
to an object pure in curvature and colorlessness, a bare bit of beauty fie for 
Euclid's cold eye, perhaps a joy forever."4 Danco knows better than most chat � 
witty putdown is worth 10,000 words of philosophical argument. 
Do not misconstrue me here: I agree with Danto's point that you have to 
know what's going on in a work of art before you can identify and appreciate 
many of its relevant beauties. s But Danto's trivializing rhetoric about beauty a� 
our possible responses to it goes beyond the making of tlhis reasonable point. 
Why the scorn? Why the ridicule? Why, in ocher words, the rhetorical overkill� 
My suggested answer: Attacks of such kinds are often signs that a genuine threa­
is sensed, one, furthermore, for which there are no adequate defenses. And 
indeed I speculate here that Danto intuits at some deep and inchoate level cha1 
in the whole realm of aesthetics in general lies a fundamental danger to his 
philosophical position on art, but a danger that he does not see clearly and thus 
has no philosophical defense against. 
I say 0deep and inchoate level," for a peculiarity of Danto's writing on art, I 
find, is that in it he over and over again allows glimpses of his true aesthetic 
"enemy" (in contrast to the his phoney, trivial, and explicitly recognized aes­
thetic enemy) to appear, but always dimly, always with its true significance veil 
and disguised, as if he is engaged in a kind of terrible, but instinctive exorcism, cj 
a half .. remembered ritual of appeasement to some vague spirit of evil. I take as 
my point of departure just one, but perhaps the most striking, of these many 
passages. 
II 
At one point in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace Danto is answering an 
objection to his notion that art historical interpretations constitute works of art. 
He considers a certain "purist" nonrepresentational artist who wants to reject 
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�10rerpretatioru .. and who chus says of her rainting chat it is jusc t-lack and whi{e 
paint. noching more. Danco argues char for the artisc co say this is not the same 
as for che unrutored "man on the street'
. to sa · Lt. for the artist in saying ic 
presuppose� a whole hismry and concext of other and opposing views of an. 
Pursuing chis point by means of an analogy. Danco writes the following: 
I like co think of the return to painc as art as a rather Buddhist 
ching. For a long time, people appreciated art as revealing a 
certain reality. Instead of seeing paint they saw fl girl in the 
window, the rape of che abine women, the Agony in the 
garden, the ascension of the Virgin. And so it would be like 
seeing the objects of this world as essentially unreal and merely 
things ·co be put behind one as one moved to higher things. to a 
world beyond, which would be a certain kind of religious attitude 
coward the world. The Samsara world, as it is called, contrasts 
with N irvana, and we are caught to see rhe world itself as some­
thing co be sublaced. But in the higher teaching of radical 
Buddhism - the te·aching of the Diamond Surra - the disrinc­
rion be·rween Nirvana and Samsara coUapses: the world is not 
to be sublaced in favor of a higher world, but is to be charged 
itself with the qualities of the higher world. We find this magnif­
icently expressed in the passage from Ch'ing Yuan: "Before I 
had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains 
and waters as waters. When I arrived at amore intimate know­
ledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not 
mountains, and waters are not waters. But now that I have got 
the very substance,. I am at rest. For it is just chat I see moun­
tains once again as mountains and waters once again as waters." 
He sees mountains as mountains, but it does not follow chat he 
sees them as mountains just as he saw them before. For he has 
returned to them as mountains by the route of a complex set of 
spiritual exercises and a remarkable metaphysics and epistem­
ology. When Ch'ing Yuan says a mountain is a mountain, he is 
making a religious statement: the contrast between a mountain 
and a religious object has disappeared through making the 
mountain into a religious object.6 
Now Danco is here taking chis "Buddhist thing" only as an analogy to his view 
of the transformative power of arc-historical interpretation. And yet what I find 
intriguing in chis analogy is, first, its elaborateness and exoticism, and, second, 
the rather loving elaboration that Danco devotes to it - more, one would think, 
than is needed to make a point chat is easily, and perhaps more easily, made 
without the use of the analogy at all. But the most intriguing thing in the 
analogy, I find, is that Danto»s bringing up the whole subject of this Zen perspec­
tive conjures into view a notion (or family of notions) of art itself that resonates 
strongly in contemporary and modem arc and art theories. Furthermore, these 
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are theories that Danco, as far as I am aware. never d1scusse . but th�,. ar� 
theories tha� in their world,encompassing implicauons, m1ghc seem to chreacen 
to overwhelm and obliterate the kind of art,hi.storically based theory of art thac 
Danco argues for. Hence perhaps his use of the trh·ializing and distancing phrase 
- "a Buddhist c:hing" - ICO refer co what is, .after all. a point of \'iew of co mic 
proportions. 
However all thac may be, I propose co take Danto's description of this 
'"religious point of view" toward mountains and waters and Danro' coupling of ic 
with the view of "paint as art" ro conscruct from them a hypothetical artist who 
makes a hypothetical lcind of art chat is, in true Dantoesque fashion, constituted 
by a particuJar (and again hypothetical) theory of art. I shall put off until later 
considering if and how this hypothetical art and this hypothetical theory 
correspond to actual an and actual views of art. 
So ... let us first suppose that our anise apprehends objects in chis Zen way (buc 
without necessarily supposing that she. has come to this through the same 
spiritual path as Danto's authority, or for that matter through any definite 
"'path") and that, more significantly, she is able to make objects (her art) such 
that other persons are able under certain conditions to apprehend those objects 
in that same Zen way. (And let us agree co call this special way of apprehending 
objects, not "religious," as Danto does, but "spiritual." For the word �spiritual" 
has somewhat more universalist connotations than does the term .. religious'' and 
suggests the dissociation from both Church and deity that I think is appropriate 
in this context.) Furthermore, let us suppose that the artist believes that were 
she not able to produce objects that are peculiarly apprehendable in chat way she 
would be unsuccessful as an artist. For her theory of art is not simply that her 
works are objects intended to have this kind of spiritual dimension, but chat they 
are to provide - in some way - this very kind of spiritual experience of 
themselves. The uinterpretarion 11 of her art thus implies a particular kind of 
aesthetic experience. Note, however, that one could very well know the proper 
'"interpretation" of this artists's work without yet claiming to have the kind of 
experience she intends to produce by means of the work. Note, too, that it may 
happen that some of the audience of this art is able to experience it correctly (in 
accordance with the artist's intentions) only after they are apprised of the correct 
"interpretation" of the work. On the other hand, it may also happen that, the 
idea of this sort of spiritual dimension to objects not being unique to 
artists in general or to this artist in particular and somewhat common property 
in certain circles. some of the audience of this art might immediately have the 
1'correct» kind of experience of the art, without knowing from any other source 
(critics• reviews, say, or the artist's theoretical statements, etc.) what the correct 
interpretation of the art is. Indeed, they may be able to apprehend what the 
correct interpretation of the art is solely on the basis of their experiences of it. 
Now let us funher suppose that it is pan of the artist's theory that the 
experiences she hopes to induce by means of her works she intends as educa, 
tional experiences. That is, she hopes that these experiences will constitute a 
kind of perceptual (or aesthetic or spiritual) training so that persons who do 
have the correct experiences from her arc will, to a greater or lesser extent, be 5
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able ro rransfer thac wav of experiencing co objects Nher than her art works. 
And finall · ler us suppose that chis rheorv of the anise is intended noc simply as a 
ilieory of her own art hue as a general theorv of art. Mm·e specifically, she 
believes char ic is prec isely the experiencing of an ob1ect in this way char makes 
che object a work of art. This kind of theoretical imperialism is, l take it, far from 
unusual among artists; it is, rather, the nom1. 
Now ic follows rather direccly from this hypothetical cheorv of arc chat 
an,·thing tA.'McsoeveT can � a u.iork of arc. For it is a tenet of the general point of 
vi�w I have built inco chis artist's theory that everything discriminable in che 
experienceable world can be apprehended in such a way. And, furthem10re, it is 
by hypothesis the mission of chis artist to cry to induce persons to experience the 
rest of the world in the same way as they experience her art. And ro che extent 
char she is successful. she will ha,•e, according ro her own theory, made art out of 
non,arr. All of the .. commonplace," co adapt Datrno's use of Muriel Spark's 
phrase, will have been "transfigured." Now of course it is a consequence of 
Arthur Danco's theory of art, too, that anything whatsoever can be a work of art; 
and in rhe next section I want to use this ostensilble similarity between Danto's 
theory and the hypothetical one l have sketched to draw out the vast differences 
between them. 
Ill 
First, che reason rhat for Danto anything can be a work of art is that anything 
can be given an interpretation within an art historical context. This is nor to say 
that, in any�� art historical context, just anything can be a work of art; bur 
only chat there are no general constraints about what son of thing is capable of 
being interpreted in some possible art historical context. On the other hand, for 
my hypothetical view, anything can be a work of art for the reason that the 
crucial spiritual attitude can be taken cowards ic. Again, ic is not that for any 
gitJen experiencer anything ac all can be so experiencedi it is only chat there is 
nothing in principle about anything experiencealble (in general) that would make 
it insusceptible to such a "spiricualization" by a properly prepared experiencer. 
Secondly, for Danco any given thing could in principle be an indefinitely large 
number of different works of arc. For objects that are 11perceptually11 indistin, 
guishable from one another can nevertheless be interpreted differently in 
different art historical contexts. Thus if we take the 11interprettation 11 of an object 
co be the content of a work of arc, then we can say that, in Danco's view, works 
of art that are perceptually indistinguishable can have any number of different 
41COntents." But from our hypothetical theory of an, we can say that perceptually 
different works of art all have the "same" concenlC, if we take "content" here co 
be the spiritual significance experienced in an indefinitely large number of, 
perceptually speaking, distinct things. 
From the latter difference we can see that Danto's theory of art erects an 
indestructible difference between an ordinary thing and (what is at a given time) 
a work of art, whereas my hypothetical theory provides a (relatively) simple 
means of destroying the difference between ordinary things and (what are at a 
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given time) works of an. But of whom do I thmk when [ charge m the� :i-en­
rences that the one theory denie co them che power co desrrm• a categonal n ft 
and the ocher bestows du.s same power? To those who may be quire ourside, or ac 
best, like most reader of chis es!Jay. on the margm.s of the artworld; co those who 
may have the capacity for certain forms of aesthetico- pirituaJ experience. but 
who are definitely our.side the ranks of power constituting the arrworld: the 
recognized anises, the curators, the gallery ov.'Tlers, the en tics, the moneyed 
collectors, the art historians. 
And thus Danto's theory of art ultimately elevates the power of institutions, 
of history and tradition, and the power of its owners. tenders. keepers and 
flunlceys, over chat of the merely aesthetically sensitive or the spiritually talented. 
The theory of art I have hypothesized, on the ocher hand, debiJitaces precisely 
those same institutions and their followers in favor of the larrer. For Danro, whac 
"transfigures" an ordinary thing into a work of an is precisely its "interpretation" 
given in and by its situation in the arrworld. On my alternative, what makes of 
an ordinary thing a work of art is just the cransfigurative power of a "spiritual" 
apprehension. 
Not only do my hypothetical artist and Anhur Danco have differen{ theories 
of art, but their theories are of significantly different kinds. To bring out this 
difference in kind, let us ask, of each theory, how it might answer the question: 
How do we legiiirruuely apply the term "art" co a thing? This notion of '1legitima-
1t1on" brings out startling contrasts between the two theories. From a Dancoesque 
point of view, the question is answerable thus: We legitimately apply the term 
"art" to all chose things - and only chose - that are "interpreted" in some an 
lhistoricaJ context, that is, to what are seen as arc by a relevant portion of the 
artWorld. Danco the philosophical theorist, thus, gives up his right to determine this 
question of legitimacy to the legitimizing authorities of the arrworld. (Of course, 
this is not a big sacrifice in Arthur Danto's case, because when he puts on his 
other hat, he is one of those arcworld authorities, a perhaps not insignificant 
point in understanding Danto's theory of art.) My hypothetical artist, on the 
other hand, has built into her theory of art a "norm" of art -namely anything 
insofar as it is apprehended in a certain spiritualized way. And from the point of 
view of this principle of legitimation, there may well be "works of art" - so 
constituted by the art world - which fail to be "legitimate" works of art; and 
there may be other things which have not received and never will receive 
legitimation through the anworld, that would be legitimate works of art. All of 
which is another way of saying that my hypothetical theorist refuses to give up 
her 0legitimizing" authority to pre,existent institutions and authorities. The 
difference, on this score, between my hypothetical theory and Danto1s theory is a 
difference in theoretical posture that has divided philosophy - and not only the 
philosophy of an - since the days of Plato and Aristotle. 
But given this difference, where is its real '0cash value"? That is, where might 
this difference make a difference? Perhaps in many ways, but I want briefly to 
pursue one of these: For a person who takes Danto's general position, my 
hypothetical theory of art would just be grist for the mill. This theory and the art 
produced under its aegis would be "interpreted" and placed in its context; it 
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-ould thus joi.n all the others in the great and coforful art historical parade·. On �e ocher hand. for my hypotherical cheonst. and for others who might perhap.s 
be persuaded to her view. the verv success of her art can mean che "end of art" 
_ co allude to a theme that Danco himself has approached from quire a different 
di:reCrion - rhe ... end 
.. of an hiscory and of all the institutions of the arrworld. 
The arrworld mighr, for such a person, wither away in significance, because its 
i.rrele,·ance had been revealed. Of course, if everyone (e,·eryone in the arrworld. 
or who respects ic, say) were to be converted by the hypothetical artist, then art 
as an institution would accuall� wither away. It would \\;ther away not merely in significance because ic was perceit.ied co be irrelevanc, but it would wither away in 
realir1 because the perception would make che realicy. 
IV 
I have chus traced a difference in two theories of an - one actuaJ and one, I am 
saying. hypothetical - to two possible kinds of action that might have consider� 
able impact on the real world - to kinds of action that might actually alter the 
lives people live - especially people in and on the margins of the artworld. So it 
should be imponanc to determine which of these theories is correcc; rather, ic 
would be important if both of these theories of an were actual theories of an. But 
by what means could we make such a determination of correcmess? I think the 
Dantoesque view is, in a way, forced upon us, unless two circumstances obrain: 
fu5c, that we indeed have the kind of experience rchat my hypothetical art is 
supposed to induce and, second, that we take such experience as veridical. And I 
mean by uveridical" here "giving us insight into the way things are (truly) to be 
viewed." And che second condition is crucial, for without it, the experience that 
the art (by hypothesis) induces could be bracketed as merely the clever but 
evanescent effect - the "manipulations" - of a particular kind of art. But what 
are the conditions under which we could reasonably take such experiences, even 
if we have them, as veridical? Or, for chat matter, under what conditions could 
we reasonably reject them as non;veridical? 
Philosophy, in one of its perennial guises, might at this poinc reasonably enrer 
the dispute. For questions about truth;claims are often philosophical questions, 
especially when they are questions, as this one is, of the truth claims of a whole 
category of representations. Bue for philosophy to attempt to settle this question 
ic would have to engage specifically in (small}'a") aesthetic inquiry. For as a first 
seep in solving the problem here of veridicality, philosophy would have to 
describe and analyze those experiences themselves. But were it necessary to 
bring philosophy in for this task, it would thus be necessary to involve it in an 
area of inquiry that Danto's whole approach at best relegates to secondary status 
and at worst seeks to exterminate by trivialization. And yet if philosophy must 
engage in such inquiry precisely to determine whether Danto's philosophy of art 
is correct, then Danto is ultimately wrong about the priorities within Aesthetics. 
We might even speculate that Danto's attempted trivialization of aesthetics is 
unconsciously motivated by a desire to protect his view (and his life?) from. the 
test that philosophy would be required to subject it co. 
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o - much depend finallv upon v.:hether my h,p l lh<:ucal an-cum-,1n­
cheorv ext c.:, tn rea11C\. Jn the: iollo'' mg '>CCU on' ol chi� pa�r I '' anc t"> u���! _ 
[ tould hardl� do mort! - thac uch an art anJ uch a cheon m race h • .n c �en 
with us m che W �c for �me 200 vear and chac m chc cour e \Jt chal pcnlJ d� 
former h� become more important anJ the l�tnt:r more aruculalc. 
\' 
Even co begin to ketch a case, J nceJ co peak ot three rhmg!>: ( l )  a cercam km. 
of expenence. (2) art that concerru itself wuh th1 l>Ort of expenence. and <3) a 
theory of art that peab of such an expenence being "induced" bv :>uch art. kr 
me fir t, wirh )()me trepidaaon, introduce a name for such an e:<penencc. I \\111 
call it "the experience of secular !ipincualtcy." The modifi�r " ccular" cmph.i 1:0. 
that the pintuality LS of this world and, moretl\'Cr, char ic i!i in no obv1ou!> wcJy 
rel1giou - concerned neither with <leny nor with church. The ucpidauon afl.Sc 
from a uspic1on char even with the modifier, che cerm "spiritual" will cam· \\1rh 
it connocanons, not only of pa t and contemporary cultic experience, bur 
connotations of the occuh and of popular spiritualism. For philo ·ophers, more. 
over, there is the danger char the term will carry dogmatic baggage from 
nineteenth�century German Idealism. My persistence m using the term, de ptte 
these dangers of misunderstanding, comes from my conviction chat (a) there is 
no more accurate term and thac (b) none of the above associacions is essential L 
the meaning I attach to it. Such a category of experience is first introduced into 
modem Western arc in the poetry of William Wordswonh. Wor<lswonh in man 
places celebrates and describes chis sore of experience, which finally juscifie to 
himself his calling as a poet.7 But the verses in "Lines Written above Tin tern 
Abbey" are characteristic: "And I have felt I a presence that disturbs me with t 
joy I of elevated thought; a sense sublime I of something far more deeply 
interfused, I Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, / And the round ocean 
and the living air, I And the blue sky, and in the mind of man; I A motion and a 
spirit, chat impels I All chinking things, all objects of all thought, I And rolls 
through all things." 
Now as important as this sort of experience is for Wordsworth, his poetry <l 
not conform co my hypothetical theory of art. First, the focus of chat poetry is 
not, it seems co me, to induce che sort of experience it describes; and it is not 
animated by the theory that it should induce such experiences, despite the role 
of teacher that Wordsworth finally comes to construct for himself. Moreover, 
despite the sense, at lease in the younger Wordsworth, chat chis 11infused Spirit" 
is not a traditional or untraditional God, the poet's descriptions of the experi� 
ence are not free of suggestions of transcendence. So my idea is that in 
Wordsworth's poetry we have my hypothesized notion of art for the first time, 
but only in embryonic form. I thus imply that my hypothesized art is, as ic were, 
kind of ideal telos of a cen:ain strain in the modern arcs - a telos, further, which 
is still in the process of being realized, and a relos, still further, which I would na 
want to claim - at this time at any rate - is immanent in the history of the 
modern arts, but a telos that is a function of my own interpretive strucrure. 
9
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Progress toward the reali:aaon of this c.elos has proceeded - though I do not 
claim smoothly, or unidirectionally, or unifom1ly in aU the arts - along three 
paramerers: ( l )  che elimination. from che description and conception of the 
objecc of chis experience. of any kind of transcendence of, or over. the acrual 
world; (2) the progress from the description of. discussion about. or medication 
00 chis experience in art co the more self �conscious communication or "induce� 
ment" of che experience; and (3) the gradual expansion of che kinds of "objects" 
in the acrual world chac can yield such experiences. I wane next briefl · co sketch 
the outline of these three parameters of progress. 
I) The disappearance of notions of cranscendence. in all of its f onns, from rhe 
conc.ePtion of this sort of experience. In Wordsworth there are still faint intimations 
of a more or less 'traditional Spirit chat is "deeply inrerfused in all things." Such 
rhetoric lingers still in the "transcendentalism" of Emerson, who is nevertheless 
quite explicit that he intends no reference to the Christian God. Yet even 
Emerson still imagines an Oversoul that transcends this or thar soul, even 
though he also imagines the Oversoul as the better part of each ordinary soul. In 
Wale Whitman the rhetoric of a transcendent object completely disappears; and 
che crucial experience betokens for him an expansion of his "self," a self which 
he nevertheless differentiates from "I, Wale Whitman, son of Manhattan." 
Corning out of an independent Continental tradition, moreover, the Gemlan 
poet Rilke sees his version of this experience as one of "Orpheus" silently singing 
the world; yet for Rilke, "Orpheus" is clearly nothing but metaphor. In other 
passages, Rilke imagines the transfigured soul turned simply towards "the Open." 
But in certain modernist writers, like Wallace Stevens, for example - an 
admirer of Wordsworth, incidentally - we get, on the one side, a complete 
elimination of a transcendent "other" that is revealed in this sort of experience, 
yet, on the other side, a new sort of aanscendence. Because for them such a 
spiritual experience is not only a kind of fiction, it is incorporated into the work 
of art itself in a way thac distinguishes the work from everyday realiry. Art, for 
the modernises generally, was a way of transcending a large pare of the actual 
world, namely, the everyday world. Hence, for them. this sort of "spiritual 
experience" could be embodied in art as a kind of refuge from that everyday 
reallicy. It has thus become a project of postmodernist writers who have any 
interest in the sort of experience I am talking about to break down the modernist 
barriers between the work of art and the rest of the actual world and thus finally 
to eliminate all vestiges of "transcendence" from the experience. Possibly the 
most effective job of doing so has been done in some of the writings of Jacques 
Derrida, which, precisely because they are seen not to be in a specifically literary 
tradition (indeed because they are seen in a philosophical tradition in which 
"truth" and not "fiction" is the intention) and yet because they so clearly yearn 
to he read as a particular sort of literary production, are able to break the "frame" 
closing off "the work" from the rest of the actual world. Derrida's writings are 
hence also able to make that luminous, "spiritual" experience that they can 
induce (not to say that they do regularly induce it nor, heaven forfend, that they 
intend to do so) applicable to the non,literary world.8 
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2) The progrru from .. descnpuon" w .. mJuc.m1em.'· In \X..orJ "onh· poccn . 
of course, what we gee are, m aJJmon to descnpuon of 1Che poec's. exuaordula:' 
experiences rogecher '°'"1ch a "anery of kmcb of d1.SCUSS1011s o( them. their genes15 
in hlS own Hfe, their 1gmficance for ht calling. cheir ph1lo ph1c 1mplicanons, 
ecc. We ger che same, I would sav. m Emerson and cevem and. mJeed. m m� 
ocher licerarure, licerarure bemg weU,adapred ro uch discu ion. In \Xlh1rman's 
.. Song of Myself," on the ocher hand, we ger mo dy the apressum of Whirman's 
version of th LS experience, because che poec chinks of him elf there a "smgmf 
from out of rum5elf, i.e., hi peculiar sense of a co m1c and all,mclu 1ve self In 
some works, especially lyric poerry and mu 1c, chere LS che arrempc co ••presen( 
this experience, in Suzanne Langer' sense of a "presencarional :, mbol". Thac l!. 
such works puc che "form" of such an experience forward m such a way char we 
"know" - though not discursively - what it is like. In Rilke' "Sonnets to 
Orpheu " and the lacer "Dumo Elegies" we get this sort of presentation, I wou� 
say, as we do in some musicaJ cheacre, for example, che very lasr scenes of 
Szymanowski' "King Roger" and Brirten's "Death in Venice." Such presencatict 
is very prominenc and pervasive in twentieth cenrury painting, for example, in 
Malcvich's mosc original paintings, in Mondrian, in Jackson Pollock, in Bamerc 
Newman, che lacer Diebenkorn, in a few of Helen Frankenchaler's works. But 
"presentations" like the ones I have mentioned are, nevercheless. scill "brack­
eced" off from the ordinary actual world, .. brackeced" precisely because they are 
presencacion.s of what it is .. like" to have cercain "experiences of secular spiritual. 
icy." They are still nor quire inducemencs to such experiences, however much tht 
may provide "semblances .. o( such experiences. le is really only fairly recently 
that art comes onro rhe scene chat induces such experience, thac does not 
bracket it off form the ordinary world char surrounds ic, and thac, as a conse, 
quence, opens up the whole world as a field for chat experience. And chis 
happens in cenain works of Joseph Beuys, in some of John Cage's music and in 
some of the dance, happenings of Merce Cunningham. In Literature it has not yei 
quite happened - unless one takes seriously my earlier suggestion about some a 
Derrida's work; and some might argue that it happens with respect co Finnegan's 
Wake.9 
3) The expansion of the category of "objeccs" with respect w which the experience a 
secular spirituality can occur. In Wordsworth, of course, the experience occurs 
· 
with respect to '1nacural" objects - and not only inanimate ones - chat are 
typically common or trivial. Such objects are contrasted with the ugly, urban 
ones that were che products of che new industrialization. They are also in 
constant implicit contrast with the "elite" objects of earlier modem poetry. But 
later in the century, Baudelaire and the Symbolist poets turned precisely to the 
objects of urban civilization as a source of such experience, and sometimes co tht 
ugliest of these objects. And as an even greater contrast with Wordsworth, thest 
poets even found in their own vices - or what they took co be cheir vices -
sources of such experience.10 In a more optimistic vein, Whitman took all of the 
impulses, instincts, desires and drives of the body, as well as all of the economic 
and social activities of his society, as inclusive of his 11self1 and thus as 11objeccs" 
11
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oi his secular spirirual experience. Finally, m th� rwentieth century we find 
aftisrs rummg /err mafenals to the most commt)n. trivial. vulgar and ugly items. 
che harshest sounds and mo\'en:ems of industrial and post-industrial ch·ilization. 
And yet it is difficult to think ot artists who have tumeJ on those materials just 
lM Zen-like consciousness that I am thinking of. John Cage at his most "alea­
cory" seems to fit, however. And so - almost if noc quite, I think - does the 
Duchamp of the Readymades and of The Large Glass. 11 And then, post-finally. 
we have. as I suggested earlier. the most collagial writings of Derrida, which 
might, in the properly prepared. induce chis same kind of experience but in such 
3 form that it takes as its "objects" precisely the interpreti\'e processes that 
constitute the Oerridean tex'ts. And then. since those texts are themselves 
simply minuscule "pans" of an infinite "general text," the "Derridean experi­
ence" finally encompasses (or might encompass) all of the "general text. n which 
one commentator describes as .. a long and complicated hiscorical-intertexual 
process that no historical movement and no single text dominates or frames." •!  
And thac process is, of course, in the Derridean universe, precisely what consri­
ruces the actual world, or what is left of it in a post-modem(ist) world. 
VI 
BUit where, you should ask, can we find a theory or a theoretical tradition thac has 
cried to understand the experience of "secular spirituality''? For if I am correct 
that my hypothetical kind of art is also actual, even if imperfecdy 
and incompletely so, then our obligation as philosophers is, for the reasons 
earlier outlined, to tty to understand it and the kind of experience that is at its 
center.13  My suggested answer is that the philosophical concept most relevant to 
the analysis of the experience of secular spirituality is that which Kant, following 
some of his predecessors in aesthetics, called "the sublime" - the very word 
that Wordsworth uses to describe his own experience. I wou[d thus argue that 
the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical discussions of the sublime 
constitute the earliest significant documents in chis analytical tradition. And I 
cake this to be true even though the concept of the sublime in much of this 
tradition was applied co nature and not to art. But I agree with T.W. Adorno 
that Kant's theory of the sublime anticipates the notion of "spiritualization" in 
art.14 The notion of spiritualization - often unattached, to be sure, from the 
term "sublime" - was taken up by the post-Kantian German romantics and 
idealists. The tradition of chis sort of theory is continued by some recent and 
contemporary philosophers who are rooted in that German tradition, such as 
Heidegger, of course, but also Adorno and Marcuse. The lattier three tend, 
unlike myself, to see all art - or at least all modem art - as being "spiritual" . 15 
Finally, influenced by Kant as well as by the latter three philosophers, the 
contemporary Jean-Francois Lyotard has revived even the word "sublime" and 
sees the sublime as chiefly the sign of post-modem art - art that attempts to 
"present the unpresentable.,, 
There is thus in a strain of modem philosophical aesthetics recognition of the 
phenomenon I am calling the experience of secular spirituality. I am far from 
12
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claiming here, however, that there is an · unanim1C"\' of cheorencal result alx.,uc it 
I would venture to say, m fact, that there are probably onJv two chem.es that tigurt 
m all, or nearly all, of these cheorerieal rreaanents. One iLs the recoITTiinon char 
the concept of che mfinite LS essennaJ in che analvsLS of chLS expenence. And che 
ocher is that chis experience, whether n LS called "'the subhme" or not, belon� tn 
the same category as beauty, i.e., that it is an aescheuc concept. But whether 1t is 
conceived as radically different, within the category of the aesthetic, from beaun 
or whether it is conceived as being essentially connected to beaury is controver. 
sial within the tradition. 
From my reading of th.is literature from Burke to Lyotard, as well as from ffi}' 
own reflections, I wane now simply to summarize the issues that chis aesthetic 
phenomenon - the experience of the sublime, or the experience of secular 
spiricualiry - raises. 
l )  What is the best description of the "infinite" and of its varieties and 
modes, intimated in this experience? 
2) What, if anything, is presented ("'present11) in this experience? 
3) ln what sense is the "'infinite" still a Lranscenderu element in this experi, 
ence, and in what sense is ic not? 
4) What is the ontological significance of this experience? 
5) What is the relation of che cognitive faculties to the infinite intimated in 
this experience? 
6) What is che range of human responses to this sort of experience? 
7) What are the "proper" responses to this experience ? 
8) How does this experience compare to the experience of the beautiful? 
9) What is the relation of the infinite intimated in this experience to the 
experience of beauty? 
The philosophers in the theoretical tradition I have indicated have a variety of 
answers to these questions; to some of the questions they have no answers. Some 
of the artists, moreover, who have been concerned with rhis sort of experience 
also have or suggest answers to these questions. I list the questions here only to 
indicate the formidable casks philosophy still has ahead of it in this area of 
aesthetics. 
My remarks about an art and a view of art which - I maintain - has not yet 
been perfectly articulated and therefore has not yet perfectly appeared have 
necessarily been sketchy. What I hope, however, to have clearly indicated is an 
alternative to an influential contemporary view of what art is and of che priorities 
within the field of Aesthetics. But, even more, I hope to have suggested that the 
presuppositions of at least one prominent philosophy of art - Arthur Dante's -
together with a cenain strain in the modern arts, lead co questions about the 
foundations and validity of that very philosophy of art. And yet the questions 
cannot even begin to be answered unless aesthetic experience is seriously 
analyzed. This fact alone means that the anaesthetic attitudes dominant in 
Aesthetics today and advocated, in particular, in Dante's theory need to be 
reversed in order to defend and adequately ground that theory itself. For, as has 
13
Sircello: Towards a Critique of Contemporary Aesthetics
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1990
T oward.s A C ririque of Coruemporary Anaesthetics 5 1  
happened with respect to so many past theories of an, an itself threatens to 
cum on Danto's "institutional" theory and grind it into the historical dust. Only philOSoPhical aesthetics can assess the true danger of that threat. 
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himself claims ro criticize, as licerarure and noc as philosophy. And notice, also, chat 
to experience Derrida's work in a "spiritual" way presupposes that one has given up 
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but not quite so, when he avers chat his own writings are "meaningless." Such a 
reading of Derrida was suggested to me by Allan Megill's discussion of Derrida in 
Prophets of Extremil] (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1985) pp. 275-85, 
316-20. 
9 It is also true that the literary theorist Wolfgang Iser has suggested that the plays of 
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Iser, T� Implied Reader (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1974),, pp. 271· 73. 
10 M.H. Abrams in Nacural Suptrnaturalism draws attention to the parallels between 
the variety of experiences of secular spirituality and older forms of spirituality in 
Western relJigious traditions. Thus he points co the parallels between certain strains 
of Gnosticism and the spirirualicy of the Symbolist poets (pp. 416-17). ln fact, 
Abrams' main thesis in this book is that the secular attitudes of Romanticism in 
general show parallels to, and indeed come out of, earlier religious attitudes. This 
idea suggesr.s co me that perhaps all of the forms of what I am calling secular 
spirituality have analogous forms in earlier religious ttaditions in the West. lt is 
interesting to note in this connection that affinities have been found between the 
writings of Derrida and the CabbaHsts. Cf. Allan Megill, Prop/lers of Extremity, pp. 
316-17. These associations suggest in tum that "secular spiritualicy" in the modem 
world may be a manifestation of a fundamental form of human experience that is 
open to interpretation in a secular way or in terms of specific religious beliefs. And, 
if that is so, then the development of a secular spirituality in artistic traditions of the 
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modem '4-rnid o. 7Ukl he unJer"· ",J m term• 01 the: n."Ctl\ c:rJl2 >I a runJJmt:ma! 1, nn 
of human c>.pcnt>n<:e lo< r, LhK \'(1e,t m nnue 1 1hc: rctJ1c..J \.nn�uc:• •I rd1£10J.' 
rradmoru 1ha1 rui .. e 1:-.ttn prormru:m -1ncc: 1hc: cuduc-cmh ... emun. 
For a reading of the 3rt ' t �1an.d Dudl.imf that •upp. rt dw. -pm1\.�n. "<e R1�r 
Lip-;cy, An Art of Our Ou,n. � pmrual m Tu� Cmtn "rt ( .. hamrola. 
&Ron, 1988) pp. J 07-1 16. One of Llpse-. · phrase about Duchamp\ T� I.mg\. 
GlaJ.s l$ that u marufest> ·Zen \1mhou1 enlteh�nmem ... I am not urc that La�-v\ 
nooon of the '"•rm1ual" u cxacuy rrune, 1'-ut n Sttnl.) ra1rh c�. at lea 1 in It'> 
am.sue marufC'Slauoru Lipsey\ book a.bo offers corroboraoon of m) general 
contention that .. \f)lntual" concc:rn Jlummau.� a great deal of moJem art AnOlhcn 
volume making a 1m1lar po.nc b the CatJlogue of an exrubmon orgam.:.ed by 
Mauncc Tuchman of che Los Angelo County ML™:um of An. T� Spmn.u.J m An 
A/mTOCI Pat1Umg 1890-1985 (� Angele County Museum of Art and Abbeville 
Pr�. Los Angele: and !'Jc� York. 1986). 
'· David Carroll, Pa:riU.SWucs (MC'thuen. New Y <>rk, 19 i). p. 151. 
1 1  Note that. ho�evcr �,fling I am w �c Demda's uwn work. as - to adapt Arthur 
Danto's conccpc - bnngmg about the ''tJeach of philosophy." by mmsfigunng 1c*lf 
and every ocher form of rcprcscntanon mro a le.ind of "aeschenc" expenencc, c:hh 
� not for me mean thar philosophy mu ·c and can stop doing what 1t has always 
done, anymore than for Damo the "deach of an" means that art no longer doc� the 
mynad chmgs 1t has always done. 
1' Cf. Adorno' A�iheuc The(Jry (Routledge and Kcgan Paul: London, 1984) p. 136. 
n "Spinrualmmon" 1s Adomo's term. though H probably does not mean just whar I 
mean b)• "kcular spirituality." Neither Heidegger nor Marcuse uses chis cerm, as far 
as I 'le.now. Bur I talc.e Heidegger's idea of arc "uncovenng" or "d1.sdostng" me "rruch 
of being" and Marcuse's concept of arr providing the "beautiful image ofHberation" 
as anemplS co understand cupects of the same phenomena as are covered by Adorno·� 
"spirituaJizaaon." 
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